Abortion and Infanticide [Michael Tooley] on *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. This book has two main concerns. The first is to isolate the. text Michael Tooley’s recent book, Abortion and Infanticide Tooley advances his arguments for a liberal position with great so- phistication and in impressive. MICHAEL TOOLEY. Abortion and Infanticide’. This essay deals with the question of the morality of abortion and in- fanticide. The fundamental ethical objection.

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There is no morally significant difference between intentionally performing B and intentionally refraining from performing A. Fiona Woollard – – Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 3: The rough idea here is just this: That is, if an organism satisfies the SCR, does it follow that the organism is a person?

Is the argument valid? A Defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.

Find it on Scholar. Lawrence Torcello – – Res Publica 15 1: Jeffrey Reiman – – Journal of Social Philosophy 29 2: Paul Langham – – Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 4: A common argument against abortion: He denies that the fetus is a person. Is satisfaction of the SCR a sufficient condition for personhood?

What properties must an organism possess in order to be a person i. It is less clear at what point infants satisfy the SCR.


A comment on Tooley’s Abortion and Infanticide.

If This Is My Body …: The fetus is a person from the moment of conception. It is not clear that we have desires when we are unconscious. He holds that fetuses and infants fail to meet the SCR. Tooley wants to qualify the claim to accommodate three kinds of situations which might suggest it is false. Between Abortion and Infanticide.

Assume that A and B do not have any other consequences, and that E is the only morally significant outcome of process C. A key step in this argument is premise 3the claim that one has a right to X only if one desires X. We would still want to say that An have right to life.

Tooley’s immodest proposal: Abortion and Infanticide.

Separating the Infant From the Fetus. No keywords specified fix it.

If an organism potentially possesses P, then the organism has a right to life now. Infanticide in Applied Ethics.

A comment on Tooley’s Abortion and Infanticide.

Xiaofei Liu – – Utilitas 24 1: If an organism does not satisfy the SCR, it is not a person. Is the argument sound? This is a moral question. For example, suppose that I have become temporarily unconscious. But we would still want to say that I have a right to life.

Michael Tooley University of Colorado, Boulder. Ethical Veganism, Virtue, and Greatness of the Soul.

Tooley’s immodest proposal: Abortion and Infanticide.

But he does not defend this position in his paper. Request removal from index. Tooley thinks this argument is unsound. The SCR specifies a necessary condition for personhood. Is this argument valid? These situations suggest the following qualification: Heberlein – – American Journal of Bioethics 7 1: For example, suppose that I have been brainwashed or indoctrinated such that I do not desire to live.


The conclusion of this argument is the SCR. There is some property or other, even if we do not know what it is, that adult humans possess and that endows them a right to life.

Should Practical Reason Be Tabled? Philip Turner – – International Philosophical Quarterly 25 4: For example, suppose that I have become deeply, but temporarily, depressed and do not desire to live.

An organism possesses a serious right to life only if it possesses the concept of a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and believes that it is itself such a continuing entity. Added to PP index Total downloads 1, of 2, Recent downloads 6 months 35 11, of 2, How can I increase aboryion downloads?

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